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Doré, Proportionality and the
Virtues of Judicial Craft
Hoi L. Kong*

I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of proportionality, which played a prominent role in
Doré v. Barreau du Québec,1 gives rise to two central debates in the academic literature.2 The first pits those who believe that the concept can be
used by courts to arrive at principled decisions against those who argue
that the concept is deeply indeterminate and permits judges to illegitimately decide cases according to their subjective preferences. In the
second debate, proponents of proportionality reasoning claim that courts
are competent to assess the kinds of considerations entailed by the concept, while opponents argue that such assessments are beyond the
institutional competence of courts. The positions in these debates are often framed in terms of interpretive methodology. Those who argue
against judicial recourse to the concept of proportionality embrace formalist approaches that aim to reduce the range of judges’ interpretive
freedom. By contrast, those who write in favour of proportionality in
constitutional judgments argue that formalism occludes the reasoning
that lies behind courts’ conclusions. These proponents of proportionality
embrace purposive interpretive methods because they render judicial reasoning transparent.
In Part III of this essay, we shall see that the Court’s reasoning in Doré
touches on these debates in ways that upset the standard alignment of
*
Associate Professor, Hydro Québec Scholar, Faculty of Law, McGill University. I would
like to thank the two anonymous reviewers of this journal for their helpful comments and Olga
Redko for her research assistance. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Le Dain
fund.
1
[2012] S.C.J. No. 12, [2012] 1 S.C.R. 395 [hereinafter “Doré”].
2
For surveys of these debates, see, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, “Proportionality
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47:1 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 72; Vicki C. Jackson,
“Being Proportional About Proportionality” (2004) 21:3 Constit. Commentary 803.
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positions. The Court resolved a doctrinal debate about the approach that
courts should take when reviewing administrative decisions that implicate
Charter3 rights, and in concluding that such decisions should be reviewed
on administrative law grounds, rather than through application of the
Oakes framework,4 the Court blended formalist and purposive interpretive
approaches. Moreover, according to the positions in the standard
debates, reticence about judicial capacity to balance interests should
lead to a rejection of a proportionality analysis. Yet the Court in Doré
acknowledged the superior institutional capacity of the administrative
body in question to undertake the relevant balancing of interests and
undertook a proportionality analysis when it reviewed that body’s decision.
Although the Court’s reasoning in Doré makes it difficult to categorize
in terms of the standard positions in the proportionality debates, it is open
to challenges that are directed at the precision, coherence and accuracy of
the reasoning. In Part II, I will articulate these challenges. In Part III, I will
show in detail how the reasoning in Doré departed from the standard
academic debates about the concept of proportionality, and I will argue that
when the Court engaged a cognate set of debates, its reasoning was
unconvincing. In my view, the Court could have profitably avoided these
debates and focused instead on (1) crafting a decision that avoided the
pitfalls identified in Part II; and (2) evaluating the consequences of its
reasons. I begin by setting out the facts and reasons in Doré. The
concerns raised in Parts II and III of this paper address questions of
judicial craft, and I will conclude this paper by suggesting that the
reasons of the Court would have been stronger if they had focused on
these questions and not on academic debates.

II. DORÉ, PROPORTIONALITY AND ISSUES OF COVERAGE,
CONSISTENCY AND COMPLETENESS
The Disciplinary Council of the Barreau du Québec found that a private
letter, written by Mr. Doré to a judge concerning the latter’s conduct in a

3

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
4
R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. In
this paper, I will use the expression “Charter analysis” and its cognates to refer to the standard
method for analyzing claims that the state has infringed Charter rights without adequate justification.
This analysis incorporates the Oakes framework and when I refer to it, I am by implication also
referring to the Oakes framework.
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criminal proceeding in which Mr. Doré was counsel, violated section 2.03 of
the Code of ethics of advocates. Mr. Doré subsequently appealed the
Council’s decision, arguing that its application of the Code of ethics violated the Charter. The Tribunal des professions, in reviewing the
constitutionality of the Council’s decision, held that the decision satisfied
a standard of correctness.5 The Superior Court of Quebec upheld the decision of the Tribunal, finding that the decision “‘implicitly’ held that the
restriction was ‘justified in a free and democratic society’”.6 The Court
of Appeal undertook a Charter analysis and found that although the
Council’s decision breached Mr. Doré’s right to freedom of expression,
the breach was justified under section 1.7
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of
whether a court reviewing an administrative decision-maker’s exercise of
discretionary authority should (1) apply a Charter analysis, including the
Oakes test; or (2) apply an administrative law approach to judicial review. The Court held that the latter approach was the correct one. Citing
to the Chief Justice’s reasons in Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson
Colony,8 the Court distinguished situations in which the constitutionality
of a law is at issue from situations in which an administrative decision
applies Charter values to a particular set of facts.9 The Court further reasoned, drawing on Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v.
Canadian Federation of Students — British Columbia Component,10 that
the prescribed by law requirement under section 1 applies to norms that
are authorized by statute and are “binding rules of general application,
and … sufficiently accessible and precise to those to whom they apply”.11
The Court contrasted such norms with administrative decisions that engage the Charter rights of individuals12 and reasoned that the latter fit
uneasily with the prescribed by law requirement under section 1. The
Court further reasoned that it is conceptually difficult to determine what
the “pressing and substantial” objective of an exercise of discretion is.13

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 19.
Id., at para. 20.
Id., at para. 21.
[2009] S.C.J. No. 37, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hutterian Brethren”].
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 36.
[2009] S.C.J. No. 31, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vancouver Transportation”].
Id., at para. 53, cited in Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 37.
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 36.
Id., at para. 38.
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In addition to advancing these specific reasons for adopting an administrative law approach to reviewing discretionary decisions that
implicate Charter rights, the Court introduced more general considerations. For example, the Court invoked common law cases involving
Charter values in order to support the claim that it is difficult to apply the
Oakes framework outside of the context of the review of a law or other
rule of general application.14 In addition, the Court noted that according
to current administrative law doctrine, administrative authorities are required to consider fundamental values (including Charter values) when
exercising discretion, and that administrative authorities can be empowered to adjudicate matters that implicate these values.15 The Court further
cited academic commentary, which criticized the Court’s reasoning in
Multani.16 The Court reasoned that according to the critics, “the use of a
strict s. 1 analysis reduced administrative law to having a formal role in
controlling the exercise of discretion”.17
In light of these considerations, the Court held that judicial review of
administrative decision-making that involves Charter values (but does
not involve determinations of the constitutionality of a law) should be
undertaken using a reasonableness standard. According to the Court, this
form of review recognizes the specific expertise of administrative bodies
exercising discretion under their enabling statutes in relation to specific
sets of facts.18 By contrast, the Court reasoned, application of the Charter
analysis would result in courts reviewing administrative decision-making
on a correctness standard and would, the Court reasoned, end in de novo
review of countless discretionary decisions.19 The Court concluded its
analysis by prescribing an analytical framework for administrative actors
making decisions that implicate Charter values. According to the Court,
administrative decision-makers should consider the relevant statutory
objectives and ask how the Charter value at issue can be best protected in
light of those objectives.20 The Court described this analysis as being “at
the core of the proportionality exercise” and “requir[ing] the decisionmaker to balance the severity of the interference of the Charter protection
14

Id., at paras. 39-42.
Id., at paras. 28-29.
16
Multani v. Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys, [2006] S.C.J. No. 6, [2006] 1
S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Multani”].
17
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 33.
18
Id., at paras. 47-48.
19
Id., at para. 51.
20
Id., at paras. 55-56.
15
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with the statutory objectives”.21 The Court concluded its analysis by
recognizing the “conceptual harmony between a reasonableness review
and the Oakes framework, since both contemplate giving a ‘margin of
appreciation’, or deference, to administrative and legislative bodies in
balancing Charter values against broader objectives”.22
With this brief summary of the reasons in view, let us now turn to an
assessment of the decision. In the following we shall see that Doré is
open to challenge for reasons relating to (1) the scope of its application
and (2) the coherence and the adequacy of its reasoning. As I assess these
dimensions of the reasons, I will advance proposals that address the relevant
concerns. These proposals do not give rise to broad questions of legal
theory, but rather engage what I perceive to be failings of judicial craft.
1. Concerns about the Scope of the Reasons’ Coverage
Consider first concerns relating to uncertainty about the scope of the
reasons’ application. These concerns arise because the Court shifted terminology in three instances. First, at the very outset of its reasons, the
Court focused its analysis on adjudicated administrative decisions,23 yet
later in the reasons, the Court mentioned administrative decision-makers
who exercise discretion,24 and did not limit its discussion to adjudicated
decisions. Second, for the purposes of demonstrating that the section 1
analysis is inapt for administrative decisions, the Court distinguished
laws of general application from decisions that affect a particular individual. Yet at other points, the Court distinguished laws of general
application from administrative decision-making without limiting the
discussion of such decisions to individualized assessments, and cited to
cases in which groups, not individuals, were the objects of the relevant
decision-making.25 Third, the Court referred in certain passages to the

21

Id., at para. 56.
Id., at para. 57.
Id., at para. 4.
24
See, e.g., id., at para. 24.
25
See, e.g., id., at para. 32, referring to, among other cases, Chamberlain v. Surrey School
District No. 36, [2002] S.C.J. No. 87, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 710 (S.C.C.) (school boards that were proxies
for parents and communities) and Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of
Teachers, [2001] S.C.J. No. 32, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 (S.C.C.) (a private institution with a religious
affiliation).
22
23
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section 1 analysis in unqualified terms,26 while in other passages, it used
adjectives such as “full” and “strict” to qualify the section 1 analysis.27
These shifts in usage are potentially significant. For example, if the
Court’s reasons apply only to adjudicative bodies, we may have reasons
for excluding the application of the Charter that are independent of, or
supplement, those which the Court articulated in Doré. According to current interpretations of section 32, the Charter applies in four situations.
First, the Charter applies when an entity that is uncontroversially governmental is acting: included among such entities are Ministers, employees
within a governmental department or police officers.28 Second, the Charter
applies to entities that are under sufficient governmental control.29 Third,
the Charter applies to a non-governmental entity when and to the extent
that it is implementing a particular governmental program.30 Fourth, the
Charter applies to entities that are governmental in nature.31 Tribunals engaged in adjudication do not fit easily within any of these categories. It
may be that such tribunals would fit under Professor Hogg’s proposed test
for state action, which he draws from Slaight Communications.32 According to that test, the Charter applies to an exercise of statutory authority
under which a power of compulsion is granted.33 Yet, as Professor Hogg
himself notes, Eldridge and Lavigne v. OPSEU34 have departed from this
test. One might as a result conclude that according to current section 32
jurisprudence, tribunals engaged in adjudication are not state actors and
therefore the Charter does not apply to them for that reason, rather than for
the reasons that the Court expressly identifies in Doré.
There is a second source of uncertainty about the scope of the reasons’ application. As we have seen, the Court in some passages of Doré
focused on individualized administrative decision-making, but in other
26

See, e.g., Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 35.
Id., at para. 33.
28
See, e.g., Lake v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2008] S.C.J. No. 23, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 761
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lake”].
29
See, e.g., Vancouver Transportation, supra, note 10.
30
See, e.g., Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 86, [1997]
3 S.C.R. 624 (S.C.C.).
31
See, e.g., Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] S.C.J. No. 95, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844
(S.C.C.).
32
Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Slaight”].
33
Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2012 student ed. (Toronto: Carswell,
2012), at 37-15 [hereinafter “Hogg”].
34
Lavigne v. OPSEU, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.), cited in Hogg,
id., at 37.2(c).
27
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sections referred to administrative decision-making that is not confined
to individuals. The distinction is significant because the rationales for
excluding a Charter analysis from cases of individualized administrative
decision-making may not apply to administrative decision-making involving groups. For example, in the language rights context, an
executive’s decision, under a statutory scheme, not to extend language
rights services may affect an entire community.35 The general application
of such a decision may render it similar to a situation in which a legislature passes a statute that violates the language rights of an entire
community.36 The Court in Doré seems to distinguish individualized decision-making from general rules on the basis that the former involves
specific facts, while the latter are applied generally. Yet an impugned decision affecting a group and an impugned statute that targets an
identifiable group are not obviously distinguishable on these bases. Each
involves specific facts and each has general, not individualized, application.37 If the cases are indistinguishable, then one implication of the
reasons in Doré might be that a court would be justified in applying the
Charter analysis to governmental decisions involving entire groups, but
this implication is not spelled out clearly in the reasons.
The Court compounded this uncertainty about the classes of administrative decision-makers and the kinds of decisions to which its reasoning
applies when it inconsistently used adjectives to qualify the section 1
analysis. The Court sometimes used adjectives such as “full” and “strict”
to modify “section 1 analysis” when the Court reasoned that the section 1
analysis should not be applied to administrative decision-making. This
usage creates uncertainty about whether and when a “partial” section 1
analysis would be appropriate in cases involving administrative decisionmaking. If one were to accept the above discussion of the ambiguities in
the Court’s reasoning, one might argue for a complete exclusion of the
Charter analysis from adjudicative or individualized administrative decision-making, but accept some form of Charter analysis in other situations.
35

See, e.g., Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), [2003] S.C.J. No. 63,
[2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Doucet-Boudreau”].
36
See, e.g., Nguyen v. Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports), [2009] S.C.J. No. 47,
[2009] 3 S.C.R. 208 (S.C.C.).
37
It is worth noting that in Hutterian Brethren, supra, note 8, the majority in obiter at
paras. 67-71 specifically distinguished individualized decision-making from rules of general
application in order to demonstrate that the concept of reasonable accommodation was not pertinent
to a s. 1 analysis involving legislation. The majority in that case emphasized that it is the individual
focus of such decisions that attracts a reasonable accommodation analysis, but in making this
argument, the majority did not expressly address cases in which a decision affects an entire group.
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In addition, the Court’s inconsistent use of adjectives to modify “section
1 analysis” could be taken to suggest the possibility of a modified or
“partial” Oakes test to at least some forms of non-adjudicative administrative decisions. Fox-Decent and Pless have argued that Lake,38 which
the Court cites in Doré, represents one version of a modified application
of the Oakes test. In that case, the Court deferred to the Minister’s
assessment of whether an infringement of a Charter right was justified.39
But as Fox-Decent and Pless note, such a degree of deference is unprecedented, particularly because on the facts of Lake it did not seem as
if the Minister actually undertook a section 1 analysis.40 This level of
deference significantly lightens the burden a government bears to justify
an infringement of a constitutional right, and if this is what the Court in
Doré meant by a modified or partial, rather than a full or strict section 1
analysis, it might have justified such a shift in terms more explicit than
the ones offered in Doré.
There is a final concern about the scope of the reasons’ coverage that
Fox-Decent and Pless identify. In Doré, there was no question that the
administrative decision-maker had infringed a Charter right, but there
may be cases in which such a question is engaged. The Court in Doré is
not entirely clear as to whether administrative decision-makers’ judgments about whether a Charter right has been infringed at all, as opposed
to whether such an infringement is justified, should be reviewed on a
deferential standard of reasonableness.41 If these former determinations
are to be made on a reasonableness standard, a heavier burden would
seem to be imposed on a party seeking judicial review of administrative
action that implicates a Charter right than the burden that would be imposed on a claimant challenging legislation (or regulations) on Charter
grounds. If the Court in Doré intended to create such a distinction, it
might have offered an explicit justification for doing so, but if it did not
intend to do so, it might have expressly ruled out such a distinction. The
Court’s lack of precision in this instance, as in the instances identified
above, creates a degree of uncertainty that is further heightened by a
conceptual incoherence in the Doré reasons and by the incompleteness of
some of the Court’s reasoning. Let us turn now to these matters.
38

Supra, note 28.
Evan Fox-Decent & Alexander Pless, “The Charter and Administrative Law: CrossFertilization or Inconstancy?” in Colleen M. Flood & Lorne Sossin, eds., Administrative Law in
Context (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2013) 407, at 427-28).
40
Id., at 428.
41
Id., at 430.
39
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2. Concerns about the Coherence and Adequacy of the Reasons
Recall that according to the Court in Doré, subjecting administrative
decision-makers to Charter analysis would subject them to a correctness
standard that would require courts to undertake de novo examinations of
a wide range of decisions in the administrative state. The Court cited Professor Mullan42 for this proposition, and in my view this holding and this
citation give rise to concerns about the internal coherence of the reasons
in Doré and the adequacy of the reasons advanced. Consider first the issue of internal coherence.
In the concluding lines of its analysis of the proper approach to judicial review of administrative decisions that implicate Charter issues, the
Court wrote: “there is … conceptual harmony between a reasonableness
review and the Oakes framework, since both contemplate giving a ‘margin of appreciation’, or deference, to administrative and legislative
bodies in balancing Charter values against broader objectives”.43 This
claim seems to be inconsistent with the Court’s assertion earlier in the
reasons that subjecting administrative action to Charter scrutiny would
result in de novo review of such action. That claim expressed a concern
that courts will be insufficiently deferential to administrative decisionmaking. But if (as the Court suggests) the Oakes test, like reasonableness
review, allows for similar degrees of deference, then the objection cannot
stand. Either the two approaches are inconsistent because the Oakes test
results in a more stringent standard of review, or they are in harmony
because they accord similar degrees of deference to state action. They
cannot be both.
Furthermore, the Court relied on Professor Mullan’s interpretation of
Multani to support its conclusion about de novo review under the Oakes
test.44 In my view, that interpretation is problematic. According to Professor Mullan, although the majority in Multani made gestures towards
deferring to the administrative decision-maker, the majority ultimately
reviewed the decision on a non-deferential correctness standard because
it found that the decision amounted to a complete ban on the claimant’s
right to exercise his religious freedom.45 Professor Mullan seems to conclude that because in Multani no deference was accorded to the
42
David Mullan, “Administrative Tribunals and Judicial Review of Charter Issues after
Multani” (2006) 21 N.J.C.L. 127 [hereinafter “Mullan”].
43
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 57.
44
Id., at para. 51.
45
Mullan, supra, note 42, at 142.
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administrative decision-maker, courts will in general adopt a nondeferential stance when applying the Oakes test to the actions of such
decision-makers.46 But this is a non sequitur. It is true that when the state
infringes a right in a way that amounts to a complete ban on that right, a
court will consider such a ban to be a factor favouring non-deferential
review under the Oakes test.47
However, courts engaged in a section 1 analysis will not always engage in non-deferential review. In particular, when the impugned state
action involves balancing interests, or considering competing social science evidence, courts will consider adopting a deferential stance.48 As a
consequence, and contrary to what the Court in Doré suggested, the simple fact that a court applies the Oakes test to an administrative decision
does not mean that it will engage in non-deferential review. In order to
avoid this implication, one might read the Doré decision more narrowly
to say that once a court has established that the applicable standard of
review is reasonableness, it should defer to administrative decisionmakers, even when they engage in actions that amount to a total ban on
the exercise of a Charter right. Yet if the Court had meant to take this
position, I suggest that it should have offered specific supporting reasons.
It is not enough, in my view, to express general concerns about consigning administrative law to a mere “formal role”.49
There is another point in the reasons in Doré at which the Court offered little in support of a conclusion. The Court held that “when
exercising discretion under a provision or statutory scheme whose constitutionality is not impugned, it is conceptually difficult to see what the
‘pressing and substantial’ objective of a decision is”.50 The Court cited no
authorities in support of this claim, nor did it explain the specific nature of
the conceptual difficulty. This lacuna is particularly striking, given that the
Court in Multani articulated just such an objective.51 The majority in
Multani reasoned that the Commission’s decision was prescribed by law
46

Id., at 142-43.
See, e.g., RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68,
[1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (S.C.C.).
48
Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927,
at 989-90 (S.C.C.).
49
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 33.
50
Id., at para. 38.
51
It is equally striking that only two months earlier the Court released Canada (Attorney
General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 (S.C.C.),
in which a unanimous Court at para. 137 applied a s. 1 analysis to an exercise of ministerial
discretion and had no difficulty in articulating a pressing and substantial objective.
47
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because it was made pursuant to a statutory grant of discretion,52 and
concluded that the pressing and substantial objective behind the decision was to ensure a reasonable level of safety in schools.53 It may be
that the Doré Court found the presentation of the objective by the majority in Multani to be unconvincing, but the majority in Multani
evaluated without evident difficulty an objective that did not seem to be
particularly controversial. If a court effectively overrules a precedent
on specific grounds, it would seem to be prudent to offer reasons for
such an overruling, rather than simply asserting that it would be difficult to respect the precedent.
How, then, might one address the uncertainties in the coverage, as well
as the inconsistencies and gaps in the Court’s reasoning in Doré? One solution might be to propose doctrinal rules that aim to accommodate the
tensions in Doré. For example, a court might reason that the Oakes test
should apply to non-adjudicative administrative decisions that affect an
entire group, even though such decisions do not take the form of generally
applicable and accessible legal rules. Such a court might reason that the
similarities in effects between a non-adjudicative decision affecting a
group and a general rule would counsel subjecting both to the Oakes test.
In undertaking such an Oakes analysis, a court may add to the existing reasons for deference additional ones drawn specifically from the
administrative law context. For instance, a reviewing court might take into
consideration the fact that an administrative decision-maker possessed
specific expertise when such a court decides how much deference to accord an administrative decision affecting an entire group. Furthermore, a
court undertaking such an analysis might reason by analogy from Multani
in order to determine whether and how such a decision was prescribed by
law, and whether the objective advanced by the decision-maker was pressing and substantial.
Alternatively, one could imagine a court applying the current section 32
jurisprudence and concluding that tribunals engaged in adjudication should
not be subject to Charter scrutiny. In support of such a conclusion, a court
might note that it is exceedingly difficult to characterize a single pressing and
substantial objective behind any adjudicative decision.54 Our hypothetical
52

Multani, supra, note 16, at para. 41.
Id., at para. 48.
54
The reasons of Deschamps and Abella JJ. in Multani, id., at para. 111, refer specifically to
the problems of formulating a s. 1 justification for “an administrative body with quasi-judicial functions
… in light of the fact that it is supposed to be independent of the government”. One might argue that
any adjudicative decision aims to give effect to the purpose of the legislation it interprets and rely on
53
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court would further distinguish instances of adjudication from the kind of
discretionary decision-making that the Court assessed in Multani. In so
doing, it would offer specific reasons for not applying that precedent to
adjudicative tribunals and it would be clear about the standard of review
applicable to decisions about whether a Charter right has been engaged
or violated. Finally, our hypothetical court might incorporate Oakes-type
considerations into the balancing analysis that the Court prescribed in
Doré. For instance, in assessing how the Charter value at issue would be
best protected in light of the relevant statutory objectives, a reviewing
court might, as a general rule, consider that Charter values are not sufficiently protected when the administrative decision-maker imposes a total
ban on the exercise of a Charter right, and subject any such ban to nondeferential review.
Of course, these attempts at addressing the gaps and inconsistencies
in the Doré reasons are only suggestive. It is, however, worth noting that
these suggestions engage the reasons in Doré on their own terms and
assess the specific implications that arise from those reasons. The analysis in this Part did not attempt to categorize the reasons in terms of the
standard academic debates about proportionality and judicial review that
were canvassed in the Introduction to this paper. In what follows, I will
argue that one reason for resisting such a standard framing of the Court’s
reasons in Doré is that they do not fit easily within that framing. The
Court did, however, respond to positions advanced in a related set of debates, and I will close this essay with an assessment of the Court’s
engagement with those debates and a discussion of one specific consequence that the Court, in staking a position in those debates, seemed to
overlook. I will conclude that the Court should have focused on producing a set of reasons that was attentive to concerns of judicial craft,
instead of engaging somewhat carelessly in academic debates.

III. INTERPRETIVE ISSUES AND CONSEQUENCES
In the Introduction, we saw that debates about the concept of proportionality give rise to disagreements about (1) whether judges applying the
concept improperly import into their judgments subjective preferences;
Dickson C.J.C.’s decision in Slaight, supra, note 32, for this proposition. Yet in Slaight, it was a
remedial order that was at issue, and such orders can be interpreted to directly advance a legislative
purpose. It would seem to be more difficult to characterize an adjudicative judgment about, for instance,
whether a decision infringed a Charter right, as seeking to advance a legislative purpose.
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and (2) whether courts possess the requisite institutional capacity to assess the kinds of issues to which applications of the concept typically
give rise. We saw further that those who claim that proportionality analysis
involves an unacceptable degree of indeterminacy, and that courts are
institutionally incapable of undertaking the relevant inquiries, typically
favour formalist interpretive methods. By contrast, those who are more
optimistic about the ability of judges to apply the concept of proportionality with principled precision, and who believe that courts possess the
requisite institutional capacities, typically favour purposive interpretive
strategies. In what follows, I will examine the extent to which the reasons
in Doré fit within the standard debate.
1. Proportionality Debates and the Reasons in Doré: An Uneasy Fit
The Court in Doré deployed reasoning that sounds in the language of
formalism when it held that the analytic structure of the Oakes test does
not fit exercises of administrative discretion. We saw above that the
Court distinguished, as a categorical matter, generally applicable rules
from individualized decisions. Such a categorical analysis is the hallmark
of formalist reasoning.55 Yet, contrary to the standard alignment of positions in debates about proportionality, the Court deployed this formalist
reasoning in order to open the door to proportionality analysis, rather
than to foreclose it. According to the Court’s reasoning, whether a court
characterizes state action as a general rule or as an administrative decision, that state action will be subject to a proportionality analysis under
either the Oakes test or the balancing analysis set out in Doré itself.
Furthermore, when the Court rejected the application of the Charter
analysis to exercises of administrative discretion, because such an
analysis would impose a correctness standard, it advanced purposive
arguments. The Court held that a reasonableness standard would advance
the purposes of a “values-based”, rather than a “formalistic” approach to
administrative law,56 and concluded that a reasonableness standard was
appropriate because administrative decision-makers possess the
institutional capacity to undertake the relevant fact-based determinations.

55
See generally Lawrence B. Solum, “The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare
Decisis, Legal Formalism and the Future of Unenumerated Rights” (2006) 9 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 155;
Larry Alexander, “‘With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’: Formalism in Law and Morality” (1999) 66:3 U.
Chicago L. Rev. 530.
56
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 31.
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Once again, the Court resisted the standard alignment of positions in the
debate surveyed above. Authors who typically embrace purposive
interpretations believe that courts are well positioned to weigh the
relevant considerations at stake in constitutional disputes, but the result
of the Court’s purposive interpretation in Doré was judicial deference to
administrative actors who, in the Court’s judgment, possessed a greater
degree of institutional competence to make the relevant determinations
than courts.
In short, the reasoning in Doré did not fall within the standard
alignment of positions in the debates about proportionality in constitutional adjudication. The Court did not, however, avoid those debates
altogether. Instead, the Court engaged a related set of debates about formalist and purposive legal reasoning in Canadian administrative law. The
Court addressed this debate most directly when it referred to academic
criticisms of the reasoning in Multani,57 but references to the debates can
be seen throughout the reasons in the Court’s criticisms of approaches to
administrative law that it characterized as “formalistic”58 and as representing an “impoverished” understanding of that body of law.59
2. Engaging Inadequately Academic Debates
In my view, these references contribute little to the Court’s reasoning.
We have already seen that the Court’s reasoning made recourse to formal
categories and, indeed, the Court has been criticized for relying on such
categories by the authors whom it cited in Doré to support the adoption of
a purposive approach to administrative law.60 The Court’s express rejection
of formalism therefore appears to contradict the formalistic analysis it
57

Id., at para. 33.
Id., at para. 31.
59
Genevieve Cartier, “The Baker Effect: A New Interface Between the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms and Administrative Law — The Case of Discretion” [hereinafter “Cartier”]
in David Dyzenhaus, ed., The Unity of Public Law (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2004) 61, at 69,
cited in Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 27.
60
The Court cites Gratton and Sossin in Doré to support a shift away from the “formal”
approach to review of administrative decisions articulated by Multani (Susan L. Gratton & Lorne
Sossin, “In Search of Coherence: The Charter and Administrative Law under the McLachlin Court”
[hereinafter “Gratton & Sossin”] in David A. Wright & Adam Dodek, eds., Public Law at the
McLachlin Court: The First Decade (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) 145, at 157). In the text that the
Court cites, the authors criticize as formalistic the Court’s reasoning in Vancouver Transportation
Authority, supra, note 10. That categorical distinction between rules and decisions is, however, one
of the bases for the conclusions drawn in Doré, supra, note 1, and the Court refers at para. 37
specifically to the passage that Gratton and Sossin criticize.
58
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undertook, the cases it cited (including Vancouver Transportation) and
the arguments of the very academic authorities upon which it relied. The
Court’s invocation of purposivism gives rise to a similar set of problems.
Purposive approaches to legal questions are most convincing when a
clear connection is drawn between the purposes articulated and the legal
regime proposed.61 Yet, although the Court in Doré referred to various
purposes, such as allowing the Charter to “nurture” administrative law62
or preventing a “strict s. 1 analysis” from reducing “administrative law to
having a formal role in controlling the exercise of discretion”,63 it is not
entirely clear why a desire to advance these purposes would lead to the
approach proposed. For example, if, as the Court suggested, administrative
bodies should be empowered to “consider Charter values within their
scope of expertise”,64 it is not obvious why Charter review of such decisions, which would involve an application of a deferential standard in the
section 1 analysis, would not yield that result. Administrative decisionmakers subject to such review would undertake their tasks in light of the
possibility of constitutional review and would therefore incorporate
Charter considerations into their decision-making processes. Moreover, if
the justifications offered for such decisions were reviewed under section
1 on an appropriately deferential standard, administrative agencies would
incorporate Charter values in their decisions without being threatened by
persistent and intrusive judicial interventions.
Similarly, if the relevant purpose behind applying administrative law
standards of review is to avoid reducing administrative law to a “formal
role” in controlling discretion, it is not clear why courts should necessarily apply the same standard of review to administrative decision-making
involving Charter values as they would apply to administrative decisionmaking that does not engage such values.65 The Court in Doré held that
61
See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, “Foreword: Constitutions and Capabilities: ‘Perception’
Against Lofty Formalism” (2007) 121 Harv. L. Rev. 4.
62
Doré, supra, note 1 at para. 29.
63
Id., at para. 33.
64
Id., at para. 35.
65
It is worth noting that neither Evans (J.M. Evans, “The Principles of Fundamental Justice:
The Constitution and the Common Law” (1991) 21:1 Osgoode Hall L.J. 51 [hereinafter “Evans”])
nor Cartier, supra, note 59, who are cited by the Court in Doré, supra, note 1 at para. 27, to support
an exclusive recourse to an administrative law standard of review in cases where Charter rights are
implicated, argue for such an approach. Cartier expressly states at 85 that her analysis of the review
of discretionary decisions “does not lead to concluding that there is no justification for using the
constitutional standard of the Charter where discretionary decisions are challenged on the basis
of Charter arguments”. Similarly, Evans explicitly sets out at 57 the conditions under which
the Charter should apply in cases in which the legality of administrative action involving a
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the reasonableness review that is applied to disciplinary panels when
their decisions implicate Charter values should be identical to the review
of such panels more generally.66 The Court reasoned that the only alternative to such an approach would be to apply a correctness standard. But
a careful reading of the article by Professor Mullan upon which Court
relied for its reasoning on this point suggests that the Court presented a
false dichotomy.
Professor Mullan argues for a modified approach to judicial review
of administrative action when Charter interests are implicated. According
to him, the Court should place a burden of justification on government in
Charter cases to demonstrate that its decisions took into consideration the
relevant Charter values, and only when the government has discharged
that burden should a reviewing court accord that decision deference.67
Such an approach would differ from the standard case of judicial review
in administrative law where the “onus rests with the applicant to establish a basis for judicial review by reference to whatever standard is
produced by the pragmatic and functional analysis”.68 In Professor Mullan’s view, his proposed approach would give adequate weight to the
constitutional interests at stake in judicial review of administrative decisions involving Charter values. Such an approach would not reduce
administrative law to a “formal role” in controlling discretion, yet it
would not require a uniform standard of review for discretionary decisions that involve Charter issues and those that do not engage such
issues. My point here is not to claim that Professor Mullan’s approach is
correct and that the Court’s is in error. It is rather to point out that when
the Court engaged academic debates, it did so with insufficient rigour
and with a lack of attention to the arguments of the authorities it invoked.69

Charter-protected interest is challenged: “It should only be necessary to resort directly to the
Charter when a ground of judicial review that would otherwise have been available at common law
has clearly been abrogated by statute, or when the existing common law of judicial review does not
give to a Charter right the degree of protection that the applicant is seeking.”
66
Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 45.
67
Mullan, supra, note 42, at 147-48.
68
Id., at 146.
69
There is an additional example of this lack of care in addressing the arguments of
academic authorities. One of the authorities the Court invokes to support the claim that Multani,
supra, note 16, has been subjected to academic criticism in fact supports the reasoning of the
majority in Multani (Gratton & Sossin, supra, note 60, who in turn rely on Susan L. Gratton,
“Standing at the Divide: The Relationship Between Administrative Law and the Charter PostMultani” (2008) 53:3 McGill L.J. 477).
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3. Considering Consequences, Avoiding Generalizations
In the foregoing we considered concerns about how the Court in
Doré treated specific arguments in the debate about formalist and purposive approaches to administrative law. In what follows, I will argue
that while engaging in those debates, the Court neglected to consider a
significant implication of its arguments. The Court in Doré at several
points reasoned that it wanted to preserve a “richer conception of administrative law”.70 Moreover, the Court made it clear that it sought to avoid
applying the Charter analysis to discretionary decisions. The result of
applying a Charter analysis to such decisions, the Court reasoned, would
be that “a rich source of thought and experience about law and government will be overlooked”.71
Yet in attempting to avoid this outcome, the Court in Doré put into
question the availability of section 24(1) remedies. The Court in
Schachter v. Canada specified the conditions under which a section 24(1)
remedy is available, and it is worth quoting the passage in its entirety:
Where s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 is not engaged, a remedy
under s. 24(1) of the Charter may nonetheless be available. This will be
the case where the statute or provision in question is not in and of itself
unconstitutional, but some action taken under it infringes a person’s
Charter rights. Section 24(1) would there provide for an individual
remedy for the person whose rights have been so infringed.72

If we are to take the broadest reading of the Court’s reasons in Doré
seriously, then it would seem that section 24(1) would have virtually
no application, because most, if not all, of the potential cases in which
section 24(1) would apply would no longer be susceptible to Charter
review. As we have seen above, the Court in Doré can be interpreted as
having sought to preclude the Charter analysis from applying to (1) cases
in which administrative actors make decisions that affect individuals’
Charter interests; and (2) cases in which a statute, legislative provision or
other rule is not at issue, but an administrative decision-maker acts under
the authority of statute. These two conditions are the precise circumstances
under which the Court in Schachter states that section 24(1) applies.
Moreover, the Court in Schachter reasons that there may be rare
circumstances in which section 24(1) may apply in conjunction with
70
71
72

Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 35.
Evans, supra, note 65, at 73, cited in Doré, supra, note 1 at para. 34.
[1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at 719-20 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Schachter”].
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section 52(1), but then proceeds to rule out a series of possible scenarios.73
So, if section 24(1) does not apply in the circumstances in which an entity
to whom the Charter applies makes a decision under the authority of a
statute, it would not seem to have much, if any, application at all. This
consequence is particularly serious, since the Court has stated in a
discussion of section 24(1) remedies that Charter rights are only made
meaningful if there are responsive and effective remedies available to
claimants.74 If the Court in Doré effectively has ruled out recourse to
section 24 remedies by sharply limiting the cases in which those remedies
are available, then it would seem to have rendered impotent an essential
mechanism by which Charter rights are given effect.

IV. CONCLUSION
How then are we to understand this outcome in light of our discussion of the Court’s engagement with the academic debates about
administrative law? We have seen that the Court in Doré sought to advance some purposes that scholars of administrative law have articulated.
In particular, the Court (citing Professor Evans) aimed to ensure that administrative law would not be “overlooked or lost altogether”.75 And the
Court (citing Professor Cartier) aimed to avoid “an impoverished picture
of administrative law”.76 Yet while focusing on these general aims, the
Court overlooked the impact of its decision on the structure of the Charter. The analysis above suggests that at least in some circumstances,
theoretical parsimony may be the wiser course for courts seeking to resolve thorny questions of the allocation of institutional decision-making
authority. In this respect, the Doré reasons offer positive and negative
lessons. As we have seen above, the Court eschewed the standard positions in debates about proportionality as it developed its analysis of the
boundaries between Charter and administrative law review of administrative decision-making. But when the Court engaged a cognate set of
debates, it did so in ways that raised rather than resolved questions, mischaracterized positions in those debates, and overlooked important
consequences of its reasoning.
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Id., at 720.
Doucet-Boudreau, supra, note 35, at para. 25.
Evans, supra, note 65, at 73, cited in Doré, supra, note 1, at para. 27.
Cartier, supra, note 59, at 69, cited in Doré, id.
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In my view, the Court in Doré would have been on firmer ground if
it had focused on rendering a set of reasons that avoided the pitfalls identified in Parts II and III of this paper. The reasons would have been
stronger if they had avoided ambiguities, been internally coherent, offered more fully articulated support for their conclusions and closely
considered the effects of the Court’s decision on related areas of public
law. Attention should have been paid to these specific issues of judicial
craft, rather than to general theoretical concerns about “formalism” or a
“rich” or “impoverished” conception of administrative law. I do not mean
to suggest that theoretical debates in the academy have no place in the
public law jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada. I do, however,
think that those debates, which can often be pitched at a high level of
generality that is far removed from the particular circumstances in which
courts render decisions, should lie in the background and only emerge to
the fore when they are directly and specifically relevant to resolving a
question before a court. Theoretical debates should not, in my view, be
the direct and primary object of judicial analysis, particularly when
courts engage in them incompletely while overlooking the impacts of
their reasoning on structural mechanisms of the Constitution, such as
remedies. To fail to weigh adequately these kinds of impacts while at the
same time devoting significant attention to general and theoretical concerns about the nature of administrative law is to engage in reasoning
that lacks a sense of proportion.

